Report

Teaser, summary, work performed and final results

Periodic Reporting for period 1 - ROBUST (Robust Mechanism Design and Robust Prediction in Games)

Teaser

The main objectives of the projects are two-fold: (i) to develop tnew heoretical methodology of robust mechanism design and apply it to various economic problems; and (ii) to study robust predictions in game theory and assess its economic significance. Conceptually, the...

Summary

The main objectives of the projects are two-fold: (i) to develop tnew heoretical methodology of robust mechanism design and apply it to various economic problems; and (ii) to study robust predictions in game theory and assess its economic significance. Conceptually, the robustness in these projects are achieved by imposing much less assumptions on the behaviors of economic agents in predicting their behaviors. This is an important direction of the economics researches, since the analyses under ``too strong\'\' assumptions have been criticized for long time. It would provide more sensible and relevant analyses of economic problems both in economic theory and application, whereby contributing to the society.

Work performed

(i) Revisions requested in peer-reviewed journals:
``On the foundations of ex post incentive compatible mechanisms\'\', with Shuguang Zhu, by Journal of Economic Theory.
This is one of the sub-projects included in the original proposal, but with more advanced results than described in the proposal.

``Divergent Interpretation and Divergent Prediction in Communication\'\', with Shintaro Miura, by Games and Economic Behaviors.
This is one of the sub-projects included in the original proposal, but with more advanced results than described in the proposal.

``Revenue-capped efficient auctions\'\', with Nozomu Muto and Yasuhito Shirata, by Journal of European Economic Associasion.
This is not in the original proposal. However, it is related to ``Application 1.2\'\' of the original proposal: in an application of this paper, we consider competing (finitely many) auction designers, and partially analyze its effect on the efficiency. This would be direcly related to approximate efficiency question in ``Application 1.2\'\' of the original proposal.

``Asymmetric information allocation to avoid coordination failure\'\', with Fumitoshi Moriya, by Journal of Economics and Management Science.
This is one of the sub-projects included in the original proposal, but with more advanced results than described in the proposal.

``Order on types based on monotone comparative statics\'\', with Takashi Kunimoto, by Journal of Economic Theory.
This is one of the sub-projects included in the original proposal, but with more advanced results than described in the proposal.

(ii) New working papers ready:
``Revenue guarantee in auction with a (correlated) common prior and additional information\'\'.
This is one of the sub-projects included in the original proposal, but with more advanced results than described in the proposal.

``Optimal public information disclosure by mechanism designer\'\'.
This is one of the sub-projects included in the original proposal, but with more advanced results than described in the proposal.

Final results

Further results are expected along the lines described above, until the end of the project period.