Report
Teaser, summary, work performed and final results
Periodic Reporting for period 1 - EPISTEMEBEHAVIOUR (Behaviour, knowledge, policy. The philosophy of science perspective on the applications of the behavioural sciences in policymaking.)
Teaser
The behavioural sciences have become increasingly important for addressing societal challenges. Proponents of the recent applications of behavioural science to policy believe that important societal problems can be addressed by interventions informed by behavioural research...
Summary
The behavioural sciences have become increasingly important for addressing societal challenges. Proponents of the recent applications of behavioural science to policy believe that important societal problems can be addressed by interventions informed by behavioural research.
This research project challenges the epistemic presumption underlying such approach to policy and shows that it rests on an image of the behavioural sciences which simplifies in consequential ways the understanding of the kind of knowledge the behavioural sciences provide. The analysis of what is actually known on the basis of behavioural research has been lacking in recent debates on behavioural policy and nudging. Recognizing this enables a change of perspective on the role of behavioural research in policy settings and it sheds new light on how behavioural science and practices of states are entangled. The project investigates the epistemic and non-epistemic role which the image of the behavioural sciences plays in the behavioural policy project, as well as its consequences.
I show that the current practices of relying on the behavioural sciences in policymaking are based on an epistemic presumption which is not substantiated in research on the basis of which behavioural policies are claimed to be designed. Acknowledging that behavioural policy (and the debate on it) rest on an image of the behavioural sciences, enables a complete change of perspective on the role of behavioural research in policy settings. If behavioural economics and cognitive psychology don’t offer us knowledge which proponents of behavioural policy claim to have, in what sense are they ‘policy relevant’? I suggest that the main function of this behavioural research in policymaking is to reframe societal and policy challenges as problems of individual human behaviour, in the light of the image of the behavioural sciences mentioned above. Such framing, if widely accepted, has important consequences: it makes it difficult to bring to policy other research perspectives which could be useful in addressing societal challenges, including other approaches in behavioural research. I show that there is still not enough understanding about the sense in which behavioural science does and can inform policy. I offer systematic understanding of the nature of scientific findings in behavioural research and their role in policy. Thus, apart from contributing to the academic research by proposing original and novel approach in philosophy of science, my research is policy relevant, and also has the potential to foster the public understanding of science.
Work performed
At Stanford University, I worked on the parts of my project and my argument which are inspired by work of Professor Helen Longino in general philosophy of science and philosophy of the behavioural sciences, who sponsored my stay. Prof. Longino analyses pluralism of approaches within the behavioural sciences and value-ladenness of behavioural research. These are two important features in the behavioural sciences that have been overlooked so far and that should be addressed in this context, including by philosophers of science who address behavioural policies. This pluralism and partiality of behavioural research poses a serious challenge to the applicability of the behavioural sciences in policy contexts. I address this challenge and I show why and how non-epistemic values play a crucial role in influencing which behavioural evidence enters policy contexts. I had been regularly meeting with Prof. Longino in order to discuss these topics and their importance for developing my project.
I presented my research during the following prestigious conferences and colloquia in the US:
May 2019 - Why value-ladenness of the behavioral sciences should lead to rethinking the widespread views on their policy relevance/ The 9th Annual Values in Medicine, Science, and Technology Conference/University of Texas/ Dallas
May 2019 - (Invited colloquium talk) On the mistaken image of the behavioral sciences in policy: lessons from history and philosophy of behavioral science/ Colloquium of Department of Logic and Philosophy of Science/ University of California/ Irvine
April 2019 – (Invited colloquium talk) On the mistaken image of the behavioural sciences in policy. Lessons from history and philosophy of behavioural science/ History and Philosophy of Science Colloquium/ Stanford University/ Stanford
January 2019 – Behavioural economics between normativism and descriptivism/ American Economic Association ASSA Annual Meeting/ Atlanta/ USA
November 2018 – Behaviour, knowledge, policy. The novel philosophy of science perspective on the applications of the behavioural sciences to policymaking (Poster)/ Biennial Meeting of Philosophy of Science Association/ Seattle
Final results
Most general philosophical treatments of behavioural policy can be found within moral and political philosophy (e.g. Hausman & Welch 2010). For instance, it has been discussed whether behavioural policy and nudging is a form of manipulation of citizens’ choices (Bovens 2009), whether it infringes their autonomy (Cohen 2013), or whether it is a form of paternalism (Veetil 2011). Political and social theorists have debated whether nudging is a manifestation of transformations within a neoliberal state (McMahon 2015; Jones et al. 2013), or whether it is compatible with existing democratic legal institutions (Lepenies & Małecka 2015). The work proposed by philosophers of science has mainly contributed to discussions on causation, evidence, and randomised controlled trials (Heilmann 2014, Gruene-Yanoff 2016, Marchionni & Reijula 2019), all of which have focused on epistemological and methodological conditions under which one can predict that a policy informed by behavioural research will bring about a desired effect (Cartwright & Hardie 2012). Hence, philosophers of science focus on philosophical problems related to studying the impact of policies on behaviour. By doing so, they do not scrutinize the kind of knowledge which is provided by ‘behavioural insights’ entering policy setting and how a narrow and selected body of behavioural research is intertwined with conceptualizations of challenges to be addressed in policy context. My project proposes a philosophy of science approach which allows us to address such questions.
I show that behavioural policies are based on an image of the behavioural sciences, and most arguments for or against bringing the behavioural sciences into policy rest on it. The image of the behavioural sciences is an interpretation of selected findings in behavioural research, which simplifies in consequential ways the understanding of the kind of knowledge the behavioural sciences provide. I confront the image of the behavioural sciences with the knowledge that the behavioural sciences actually provide. I bring insights from feminist philosophy of science (e.g. Longino 1990, Longino 2013, Anderson 2004, Keller & Longino 1996) to ask what we know on the basis of behavioural research in cognitive psychology and behavioural economics.