NETWORKS

Markets and Networks

Coordinatore	UNIVERSITE D'AIX MARSEILLE    more Spiacenti, non ci sono informazioni su questo coordinatore. Contattare Fabio per maggiori infomrazioni, grazie.
Nazionalità Coordinatore	France [FR]
Totale costo	481˙087 €
EC contributo	481˙087 €
Programma	FP7-IDEAS-ERC Specific programme: "Ideas" implementing the Seventh Framework Programme of the European Community for research, technological development and demonstration activities (2007 to 2013)
Code Call	ERC-2013-CoG
Funding Scheme	ERC-CG
Anno di inizio	2014
Periodo (anno-mese-giorno)	2014-03-01   -   2019-02-28

 Partecipanti

#	participant	country	role	EC contrib. [€]
1	UNIVERSITE D'AIX MARSEILLE  Organization address address: Boulevard Charles Livon 58 city: Marseille postcode: 13284 contact info Titolo: Mrs. Nome: Céline Cognome: Damon Email: send email Telefono: 33491998595	FR (Marseille)	hostInstitution	481˙087.00
2	UNIVERSITE D'AIX MARSEILLE  Organization address address: Boulevard Charles Livon 58 city: Marseille postcode: 13284 contact info Titolo: Prof. Nome: Yann Cognome: Bramoullé Email: send email Telefono: +3304 91 14 07 31 Fax: +3304 91 14 07 31	FR (Marseille)	hostInstitution	481˙087.00

Mappa

 Word cloud

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 Obiettivo del progetto (Objective)

'Economists are becoming increasingly aware of the importance and ubiquity of social networks. The economics of social networks constitutes one of the most active areas of research in economics. Despite much progress, however, our understanding of the relationships between markets and networks is still poor and fragmentary. This project will advance the state of the art by analyzing the relations between markets and networks in two domains.

I will first study theoretically the interaction between formal insurance and networks of informal insurance. I will analyze how the position in a risk-sharing network affects the incentives to adopt formal insurance, how network structure affects overall adoption, how formal insurance could benefit from network monitoring on efforts and whether the adoption of formal insurance strengthen or weaken the risk-sharing network. Second, I will study theoretically the impact of networks on markets with search frictions. I will derive the full-fledged equilibrium implications of network-based search in matching models of the labor market. I will also introduce recall in a finite-horizon matching model and study the impact of the emerging network of trading partners.'