CPAD

A Comparative Perspective on Parliamentary Legislative Activity and Bureaucratic Delegation

 Coordinatore Sabanci University 

 Organization address address: Orhanli Tuzla
city: ISTANBUL
postcode: 34956

contact info
Titolo: Ms.
Nome: Aslihan
Cognome: Eran
Email: send email
Telefono: +90 216 4839693
Fax: +90 216 4839118

 Nazionalità Coordinatore Turkey [TR]
 Totale costo 100˙000 €
 EC contributo 100˙000 €
 Programma FP7-PEOPLE
Specific programme "People" implementing the Seventh Framework Programme of the European Community for research, technological development and demonstration activities (2007 to 2013)
 Code Call FP7-PEOPLE-2011-CIG
 Funding Scheme MC-CIG
 Anno di inizio 2012
 Periodo (anno-mese-giorno) 2012-03-01   -   2016-02-29

 Partecipanti

# participant  country  role  EC contrib. [€] 
1    Sabanci University

 Organization address address: Orhanli Tuzla
city: ISTANBUL
postcode: 34956

contact info
Titolo: Ms.
Nome: Aslihan
Cognome: Eran
Email: send email
Telefono: +90 216 4839693
Fax: +90 216 4839118

TR (ISTANBUL) coordinator 100˙000.00

Mappa


 Word cloud

Esplora la "nuvola delle parole (Word Cloud) per avere un'idea di massima del progetto.

democracies    executive    preferences    certain    political    legislation    delegation    policy    bureaucrats    limited    governments    delegate    presidential    tradition    bureaucratic    legislating    actors    parliamentary    party    vary    institutional   

 Obiettivo del progetto (Objective)

'In all parliamentary democracies, governments delegate some policymaking competence to bureaucrats. The very conception of cabinet governments comprised of ministers, who are derived from the party majorities and held in toe with the party line, implies a certain overlap between the executive and legislature. Policy delegation in both presidential and parliamentary systems may be motivated by limited resources, informational asymmetries and a desire to gain from bureaucratic expertise, but it also creates a certain moral hazard by granting bureaucrats the opportunity to act against the legislative preferences of the parliament. Parliamentary legislation can limit the potential for this drift, but also comes at the cost of less informed, more cumbersome legislation and the less efficient use of parliamentary resources. The propensity of decision makers to delegate vary widely across political systems and policy areas. This project asks how differences in the preferences of the legislating actors and the degree of institutional control over bureaucrats may affect the extent of policy delegation in four parliamentary systems (Germany, UK, France and Turkey).

Although theoretical approaches to this topic abound, empirical research remains starkly limited. This project will test, extend and refine the transaction cost, principal-agent theory based on divided government in the US presidential system with a comparative perspective on parliamentary democracies. The selected countries vary with regard to their electoral systems, party tradition, level of democratic consolidation and legal tradition. The project will assess the relative potential for and intervening factors limiting or encouraging the use of executive policy instruments in these states over a twenty-five year period. This approach will link bureaucratic delegation to institutional design and political considerations such as popular legitimacy and preference constellations of legislating actors.'

Altri progetti dello stesso programma (FP7-PEOPLE)

EUTRIPD (2011)

European Training and Research in Peritoneal Dialysis

Read More  

HUMANARIDADAPT (2011)

HUMAN ADAPTATIONAL PATTERNS TO ARID ENVIRONMENTS IN NORTH AFRICA

Read More  

HEALTH ON THE MOVE (2014)

"Health on the move: Exploring the ethical, social, and political underpinnings of portable devices for healthcare and lifestyle"

Read More