SWEAC

"The Strong, the Weak and the Cunning: Power and Strategy in Voting Games"

Coordinatore	OBUDAI EGYETEM    more  Organization address address: BECSI UT 96 B city: BUDAPEST postcode: 1034 contact info Titolo: Dr. Nome: András Cognome: Medve Email: send email Telefono: 3616665201 Fax: 3616665209
Nazionalità Coordinatore	Hungary [HU]
Totale costo	45˙000 €
EC contributo	45˙000 €
Programma	FP7-PEOPLE Specific programme "People" implementing the Seventh Framework Programme of the European Community for research, technological development and demonstration activities (2007 to 2013)
Code Call	FP7-PEOPLE-ERG-2008
Funding Scheme	MC-ERG
Anno di inizio	2008
Periodo (anno-mese-giorno)	2008-09-30   -   2011-09-29

 Partecipanti

#	participant	country	role	EC contrib. [€]
1	OBUDAI EGYETEM  Organization address address: BECSI UT 96 B city: BUDAPEST postcode: 1034 contact info Titolo: Dr. Nome: András Cognome: Medve Email: send email Telefono: 3616665201 Fax: 3616665209	HU (BUDAPEST)	coordinator	9˙000.00
2	Budapesti M?szaki F?iskola  Organization address city: BUDAPEST postcode: 1034 contact info Titolo: Dr. Nome: András Cognome: Medve Email: send email Telefono: 3616665201 Fax: 3616665209	HU (BUDAPEST)	participant	36˙000.00

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 Obiettivo del progetto (Objective)

'The recent extensions of the European Union brought a priori measures of voting power (power measures or power indices) in the spotlight. Originating from game theory these measures serve as indicators of the voting powers of players in a given voting situation. However, a priori measures of voting power are no more than statistical expectations of power as a result of random voting and therefore power indices lack the game theoretical features attributed to them. We rebuild these game theoretical foundations by introducing strategic power indices: we expand the model by allowing players to reject particular coalitions and thereby possibly increase their power. We characterise strategic power indices and apply them to real-life voting situations, such as the European Union’s Council of Ministers. We discuss implications to values, in particular the Shapley value. Further, we extend these models to farsighted players, players with preferences, such as for games on convex geometries and for games on networks. We also consider a modification of strategic power indices where players can renegotiate blocked coalitions and in these negotiations different credits can be given to critical/pivotal players in the same coalition. Finally, we develop a model to calculate the “true” power of a winning coalition in a parliamentary voting situation, where the power of a particular coalition belongs to the interval [0,1] to reflect the margin by which it is winning/losing.'