PSPC

Provable Security for Physical Cryptography

Coordinatore	Institute of Science and Technology Austria    more Spiacenti, non ci sono informazioni su questo coordinatore. Contattare Fabio per maggiori infomrazioni, grazie.
Nazionalità Coordinatore	Austria [AT]
Totale costo	1˙121˙206 €
EC contributo	1˙121˙206 €
Programma	FP7-IDEAS-ERC Specific programme: "Ideas" implementing the Seventh Framework Programme of the European Community for research, technological development and demonstration activities (2007 to 2013)
Code Call	ERC-2010-StG_20091028
Funding Scheme	ERC-SG
Anno di inizio	2010
Periodo (anno-mese-giorno)	2010-11-01   -   2015-10-31

 Partecipanti

#	participant	country	role	EC contrib. [€]
1	STICHTING CENTRUM VOOR WISKUNDE EN INFORMATICA  Organization address address: Science Park 123 city: AMSTERDAM postcode: 1098XG contact info Titolo: Ms. Nome: Margriet Cognome: Brouwer Email: send email Telefono: +31 20 5924253 Fax: +31 20 5924199	NL (AMSTERDAM)	beneficiary	116˙554.22
2	Institute of Science and Technology Austria  Organization address address: Am Campus 1 city: Klosterneuburg postcode: 3400 contact info Titolo: Ms. Nome: Barbara Cognome: Abraham Email: send email Telefono: +43 2243 9000 1020 Fax: +43 2243 9000 2000	AT (Klosterneuburg)	hostInstitution	1˙004˙651.75
3	Institute of Science and Technology Austria  Organization address address: Am Campus 1 city: Klosterneuburg postcode: 3400 contact info Titolo: Prof. Nome: Krzysztof Cognome: Pietrzak Email: send email Telefono: +43 2243 9000 4601 Fax: +43 2243 9000 2000	AT (Klosterneuburg)	hostInstitution	1˙004˙651.75

Mappa

 Word cloud

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 Obiettivo del progetto (Objective)

'Modern cryptographic security definitions do not capture real world adversaries who can attack the algorithm's physical implementation, as they do not take into account so called side-channel attacks where the adversary learns information about the internal state of the cryptosystem during execution, for example by measuring the running time or the power consumption of a smart-card.

Current research on side-channels security resembles a cat and mouse game. New attacks are discovered, and then heuristic countermeasures are proposed to prevent this particular new attacks. This is fundamentally different from the 'provable security' approach followed by modern cryptography, where one requires that a cryptosystem is proven secure against all adversaries in a broad and well-defined attack scenario. Clearly, this situation is unsatisfactory: what is provable security good for, if ultimately the security of a cryptosystem hinges on some ad-hoc side-channel countermeasure? Despite this, until recently the theory community did not give much attention to this problem as it was believed that side-channels are a practical problem, and theory can only be of limited use to prevent them. But recently results indicate that this view is much too pessimistic.

On a high level, the goal of this project is to bring research on side-channels from the realm of engineering and security research to modern cryptography. One aspect of this proposal it to further investigate the framework of leakage-resilience which adapts the methodology of provable security to the physical world. If a cryptosystem is leakage-resilient, then this implies that its implementation is secure against every side-channel attack, making only some mild (basically minimal) assumptions on the underlying hardware.'