CORPDEBTMKT
THE STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE DEBT MARKETS AND FIRM FINANCING DECISIONS
| Coordinatore | THE CITY UNIVERSITY
Organization address
address: NORTHAMPTON SQUARE contact info |
| Nazionalità Coordinatore | United Kingdom [UK] |
| Totale costo | 100˙000 € |
| EC contributo | 100˙000 € |
| Programma | FP7-PEOPLE
Specific programme "People" implementing the Seventh Framework Programme of the European Community for research, technological development and demonstration activities (2007 to 2013) |
| Code Call | FP7-PEOPLE-2012-CIG |
| Funding Scheme | MC-CIG |
| Anno di inizio | 2013 |
| Periodo (anno-mese-giorno) | 2013-03-01 - 2017-02-28 |
Partecipanti
| # | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 |
THE CITY UNIVERSITY
Organization address
address: NORTHAMPTON SQUARE contact info |
UK (LONDON) | coordinator | 100˙000.00 |
Mappa
Word cloud
Esplora la "nuvola delle parole (Word Cloud) per avere un'idea di massima del progetto.
Obiettivo del progetto (Objective)
'Unlike equities, corporate debt claims are currently mostly traded in over-the-counter (OTC) markets. Since the OTC nature of the market decreases price transparency, increases transaction costs, and increases the time it takes to find a matching counterparty for a trade, there is a fundamental economic question as to why an apparently imperfect matching technology (OTC trade) can arise in equilibrium when a better matching technology (organized exchanges) exists. This is puzzling because some corporate debt claims actually used to be traded on exchanges in the early 20th century, and important because the structure of this large market has important knock on effects: on who can participate in markets, on how claims are structured (in particular in terms of their maturity) and also how firms finance themselves. In the context of models that build on search theory, this project will explore potential mechanisms that explain 1) what drives the structure of secondary markets for corporate debt, and 2) how this affects firm financing decisions, in particular, debt maturity choice, and 3) what the policy implications are for regulation.'