CAND
Collective Attitudes and Normative Disagreement
| Coordinatore | UNIVERSIDAD POMPEU FABRA
Organization address
address: PLACA DE LA MERCE 10-12 contact info |
| Nazionalità Coordinatore | Spain [ES] |
| Totale costo | 230˙036 € |
| EC contributo | 230˙036 € |
| Programma | FP7-PEOPLE
Specific programme "People" implementing the Seventh Framework Programme of the European Community for research, technological development and demonstration activities (2007 to 2013) |
| Code Call | FP7-PEOPLE-2013-IEF |
| Funding Scheme | MC-IEF |
| Anno di inizio | 2014 |
| Periodo (anno-mese-giorno) | 2014-10-01 - 2016-09-30 |
Partecipanti
| # | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 |
UNIVERSIDAD POMPEU FABRA
Organization address
address: PLACA DE LA MERCE 10-12 contact info |
ES (BARCELONA) | coordinator | 230˙036.60 |
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Obiettivo del progetto (Objective)
'CAND - Collective Attitudes and Normative Disagreement concerns the perspectival nature of legal discourse. The main aim of the project is to increase our understanding of legal and normative discourse in light of contemporary accounts of the semantics and pragmatics of deontic modals, and of collective intentionality. This is a highly interdisciplinary project, connecting various philosophical disciplines with jurisprudence. The project will apply state-of-the-art theories and arguments of contextualist semantics about deontic modals and value predicates to the case of statements of law (i.e. statements of what, according to law, one ought to do). This will be achieved by a systematic exploration of the relationship between four debates in four different areas: first, the problem of the semantics and pragmatics of ought and might claims in philosophy of language; second, the debate on the perspectival nature of legal statements in legal philosophy; third, the debate on dispositional accounts of normative facts and values in metaphysics; and fourth the debate on collective intentionality in the philosophy of mind and action. Marques believes that there is a common set of issues underlying these seldom-connected debates. Her guiding research idea is that contextualist semantics is adequate for all normative statements, and difficult cases can be explained with a combination of (i) pragmatic accounts of the metalinguistic selection of appropriate standards, and (ii) proper accounts of collective intentionality. The project will pursue three objectives in particular: (O1) To develop the case for contextualism about deontic modals in the domain of normative legal statements and judgments. (O2) To investigate the role of joint commitments and collective intentionality in normative disputes, and the constitution of normative facts. (O3) To assess the relevance of the results achieved under O1 and O2 for the ongoing debate about legal positivism and the nature of law.'