RIFIFI
Risk Incentives in Financial Institutions and Financial Instability
| Coordinatore | FONDATION NATIONALE SCIENCES POLITIQUES
Spiacenti, non ci sono informazioni su questo coordinatore. Contattare Fabio per maggiori infomrazioni, grazie. |
| Nazionalità Coordinatore | France [FR] |
| Totale costo | 564˙000 € |
| EC contributo | 564˙000 € |
| Programma | FP7-IDEAS-ERC
Specific programme: "Ideas" implementing the Seventh Framework Programme of the European Community for research, technological development and demonstration activities (2007 to 2013) |
| Code Call | ERC-2010-StG_20091209 |
| Funding Scheme | ERC-SG |
| Anno di inizio | 2010 |
| Periodo (anno-mese-giorno) | 2010-11-01 - 2016-07-31 |
Partecipanti
| # | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 |
FONDATION JEAN-JACQUES LAFFONT,TOULOUSE SCIENCES ECONOMIQUES
Organization address
address: ALLEE DE BRIENNE, Manufacture des Tabacs 21 contact info |
FR (TOULOUSE) | beneficiary | 300˙739.69 |
| 2 |
FONDATION NATIONALE SCIENCES POLITIQUES
Organization address
address: RUE SAINT GUILLAUME 27 contact info |
FR (PARIS CEDEX 07) | hostInstitution | 263˙260.31 |
| 3 |
FONDATION NATIONALE SCIENCES POLITIQUES
Organization address
address: RUE SAINT GUILLAUME 27 contact info |
FR (PARIS CEDEX 07) | hostInstitution | 263˙260.31 |
Mappa
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Obiettivo del progetto (Objective)
The main objective of this research project is to develop a new framework for the study of the informational frictions that separate investors from sophisticated traders operating in complete markets. I plan to develop a model of “generalized risk-shifting,” in which traders in complete markets can secretly take fair bets with any arbitrary distribution. The goal is to study the interplay of this generalized risk-shifting with traders’ career concerns. When investors learn about trading skills from observing traders’ realized returns, taking exposures on risk factors with rare adverse realizations may help a trader temporarily improve her reputation and attract more funds. The first intermediary step of this project consists in fully characterizing the payoff functions that lead a trader to gamble inefficiently in a one-period setting. The second step consists in solving for contracts that are risk-shifting-proof in a dynamic career concern environment. Finally, the model is well suited to be taken to hedge fund data