Coordinatore | KOC UNIVERSITY
Organization address
address: RUMELI FENERI YOLU SARIYER contact info |
Nazionalità Coordinatore | Turkey [TR] |
Totale costo | 75˙000 € |
EC contributo | 75˙000 € |
Programma | FP7-PEOPLE
Specific programme "People" implementing the Seventh Framework Programme of the European Community for research, technological development and demonstration activities (2007 to 2013) |
Code Call | FP7-PEOPLE-2010-RG |
Funding Scheme | MC-IRG |
Anno di inizio | 2011 |
Periodo (anno-mese-giorno) | 2011-06-01 - 2014-05-31 |
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KOC UNIVERSITY
Organization address
address: RUMELI FENERI YOLU SARIYER contact info |
TR (ISTANBUL) | coordinator | 75˙000.00 |
Esplora la "nuvola delle parole (Word Cloud) per avere un'idea di massima del progetto.
'Auctions are important and widely used trading mechanisms. Bidders often undertake investments in relation to an auction they participate in. For example, firms may invest in research and development prior to bidding for public procurement in order to reduce their costs or improve the quality of the goods and services they are offering. The main objective of the proposed research project is to further understand bidders’ incentives for these types of investments and how these incentives interact with the auction rules, and the consequences in terms of efficiency and the seller’s revenue (or the cost of procurement). This understanding will have both theoretical and practical implications in terms of auction design. The project will also be a contribution to the endogenous entry literature.
One of the distinguishing features of the project in comparison to the previous literature is allowing firms to have private information at the time of investment, which is quite natural, as firms know more about their own profitability than their competitors. Second, the question of the timing of investments will be addressed, since firms can invest after as well as before the auction. Finally, the issue of observability of investments (at the auction stage) will be tackled. In this general framework, it will be possible to study the firms’ incentives to invest and investigate the performance of commonly used auction formats in terms of efficiency and the revenue of the seller under various specifications. In addition, optimal auctions will be studied using the mechanism design approach.
The proposed research project is theoretical. It also aims to help future empirical studies of investments and entry in auctions. It will also be of interest to policy makers, given that auctions are commonly used in government procurement and in selling public assets, and that investment opportunities are ubiquitous in these settings.'
Auctions are an important but perhaps misunderstood form of trading. An EU project modelled the effects of investment decisions and private information on the efficiency of the auction process, clarifying the complexities for policy purposes.
A common form of trading, auctions are important in a number of areas, including business and government. The sales are seen as the most efficient means of achieving the best price, an assumption that may be flawed or oversimplified.
Such was the motivation for the investigation by the EU project 'Auctions with investments: Timing and information' (AUCTIONS AND INVEST). Funded through the Marie Curie career development programme for researchers, the project ran for three years to May 2014.
The theoretical study aimed to further understanding of auctions in terms of investment decisions and private information. The project examined firms' incentives and preferences concerning investment, practices concerning deterring competitors, whether more efficient first bidders invest more, and seller preferences regarding investment. The research uniquely considered the importance of private information, conventionally assumed not to be a factor. Other original factors included cost-reducing investments made after a procurement option, which is contrasted against the prevailing view of the pre-investment case. Last of the unique considerations was observability, comparing two extreme examples of observable and unobservable investments.
Research was conducted through modelling work, with the model being used to compare different variables of information availability.
Project outcomes will aid future empirical studies of investment and entry in auctions. As such, the work will help to inform policymakers, through clarifying potential complexities of the auction environment.