INFORMATIONFLOW
Information Flow and Its Impact on Financial Markets
| Coordinatore | THE HEBREW UNIVERSITY OF JERUSALEM.
Spiacenti, non ci sono informazioni su questo coordinatore. Contattare Fabio per maggiori infomrazioni, grazie. |
| Nazionalità Coordinatore | Israel [IL] |
| Totale costo | 1˙500˙000 € |
| EC contributo | 1˙500˙000 € |
| Programma | FP7-IDEAS-ERC
Specific programme: "Ideas" implementing the Seventh Framework Programme of the European Community for research, technological development and demonstration activities (2007 to 2013) |
| Code Call | ERC-2010-StG_20091209 |
| Funding Scheme | ERC-SG |
| Anno di inizio | 2010 |
| Periodo (anno-mese-giorno) | 2010-10-01 - 2016-09-30 |
Partecipanti
| # | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 |
THE UNIVERSITY OF WARWICK
Organization address
address: Kirby Corner Road - University House - contact info |
UK (COVENTRY) | beneficiary | 442˙562.00 |
| 2 |
THE HEBREW UNIVERSITY OF JERUSALEM.
Organization address
address: GIVAT RAM CAMPUS contact info |
IL (JERUSALEM) | hostInstitution | 1˙057˙438.00 |
| 3 |
THE HEBREW UNIVERSITY OF JERUSALEM.
Organization address
address: GIVAT RAM CAMPUS contact info |
IL (JERUSALEM) | hostInstitution | 1˙057˙438.00 |
Mappa
Word cloud
Esplora la "nuvola delle parole (Word Cloud) per avere un'idea di massima del progetto.
Obiettivo del progetto (Objective)
The importance of information asymmetry in financial markets has long been recognized in financial economics. Most existing models focus on the role of privately informed investors who influence prices through their trades. But in many cases the agents who have the biggest information advantage are insiders or the firms themselves; they are precluded from trading but can affect the information flow to the market. This endogenous information flow and its effect on financial market is the focus of the proposed project. By the term information flow we refer to a wide range of channels through which firms can communicate. The information can be part of a mandatory disclosure or a voluntary one. It can be verifiable or non-verifiable information. In addition there can be an implicit information transmission. A firm may choose certain actions to convey its private information (i.e. signaling) without any explicit announcements. The way firms convey this information may provide key insights into the behavior of financial markets and in particular the development of financial crises. The project combines theoretical and empirical work. In the theory part I plan to examine the channels mentioned above and develop testable implications. In the empirical part I plan to test these implications.