INCPATSYS

Incentives in the Patent System

 Coordinatore STICHTING KATHOLIEKE UNIVERSITEIT BRABANT UNIVERSITEIT VAN TILBURG 

 Organization address address: Warandelaan 2
city: TILBURG
postcode: 5037 AB

contact info
Titolo: Mrs.
Nome: Marjoleine
Cognome: De Wit
Email: send email
Telefono: 31134663266

 Nazionalità Coordinatore Netherlands [NL]
 Totale costo 169˙485 €
 EC contributo 169˙485 €
 Programma FP7-PEOPLE
Specific programme "People" implementing the Seventh Framework Programme of the European Community for research, technological development and demonstration activities (2007 to 2013)
 Code Call FP7-PEOPLE-2010-IEF
 Funding Scheme MC-IEF
 Anno di inizio 2011
 Periodo (anno-mese-giorno) 2011-06-01   -   2013-05-31

 Partecipanti

# participant  country  role  EC contrib. [€] 
1    STICHTING KATHOLIEKE UNIVERSITEIT BRABANT UNIVERSITEIT VAN TILBURG

 Organization address address: Warandelaan 2
city: TILBURG
postcode: 5037 AB

contact info
Titolo: Mrs.
Nome: Marjoleine
Cognome: De Wit
Email: send email
Telefono: 31134663266

NL (TILBURG) coordinator 169˙485.60

Mappa


 Word cloud

Esplora la "nuvola delle parole (Word Cloud) per avere un'idea di massima del progetto.

innovation    model    incentives    upc    court    renewal    papers    titled    rates    union    incpatsys    office    courts    patents    review    examiners    patent    examination    fees    firms    ex   

 Obiettivo del progetto (Objective)

'A key element of innovation policy is the patent system. For the patent system to perform its function of fostering innovation, an adequate process of patent review must be in place. Failure of the patent office and courts to weed out low-quality patents leads ex post to deadweight loss and costly litigation. If anticipated by firms, it may lead ex ante to an inefficient allocation of resources by diverting funds that would otherwise go into R&D towards wasteful rent-seeking activities. Understanding the incentives of the various market actors involved in the process of patent review, and the constraints under which the relevant institutions operate, is essential for designing a better patent system. It is the subject of the present proposal to advance our understanding of these issues. The research project will study how application fees can be used in conjunction with explicit and implicit incentives for examiners and judges to influence the behavior of firms, and how the legal rules used in the determination of patent validity affect these incentives. Ultimately, the results of the research project should therefore contribute to improving the level of innovation in Europe and to a more efficient use of the resources devoted to R&D.'

Introduzione (Teaser)

The European Union's Unified Patent Court (UPC) is at the core of innovation. This research project studied the current patent system from three angles to assess its current functionality.

Descrizione progetto (Article)

A patent can be defined as a temporary government-granted monopoly right on something made by an inventor. There are actually various kinds of patents, the most well-known type being the utility patent. The purpose of the patent system, as described in the project, is to incentivise innovation. The resulting three papers of this project, funded by the European Commission, examine patent examiner salaries and incentives schemes, and the behaviour of patent applicants.

This project, titled 'Incentives in the patent system' (INCPATSYS), and the conclusions drawn are important findings for the patent office and legislators governing the court. More specifically, the project infers relevant action for compensation of patent examiners, for the structure of application fees, and for the optimal patent examination intensity.

One of INCPATSYS' papers is titled 'Inventors and imposters: An analysis of patent examination with self-selection of firms into R&D'. It provides evidence that renewal rates and fee-adjusted renewal rates of patents issued to large firms increased relative to those of small firms. This is consistent with the predictions of the model.

Another of the research project's papers is titled 'Patent screening, renewal fees and the courts'. It examines the current system of how a patent is challenged and develops a different model exploring other ways a system might work.

Findings and ideas explored in this project can help refine the current patent system. With the European Union's UPC at the centre of innovation, this research challenges the current establishment and new efficiencies with new standards.

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